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This article analyses the decommissioning framework for oil and gas 
infrastructures in Brazil, Nigeria, and Trinidad and Tobago. It examines 
whether the existing provisions in each country are able to guarantee that 
the government and, by extension taxpayers, do not bear the costs of 
decommissioning and, the consequences of insolvency on residual 
liabilities. An additional motivation for this examination is the ongoing 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), a pandemic with significant 
adverse impacts on the oil and gas industry. A likely consequence of the 
economic devastation from this is the insolvency of any party with 
decommissioning obligations. 
The article argues that the provisions of the Brazil petroleum legislation 
on the reversion of abandoned installations to the government could 
imply that taxpayers have to bear the residual liabilities without any 
compensation from the concerned concessionaires or contractors. It also 
argues that the provisions of the Petroleum Law to the effect that ‘the 
reversion of facilities does not entail any expense whatsoever for the 
Brazilian government ’does not certainly translate to pecuniary 
compensation to the latter for assuming the future residual liabilities 
from abandoned installations. The Nigerian and the Trinidad &Tobago 
Decommissioning Framework also suffer the latter risk of the 
government bearing the residual liabilities for such disused installations. 
In Nigeria, the framework is silent on who bears the residual liabilities 
for disused installations. However, it is argued that the provisions of the 
Production Sharing Contracts on the transfer of ownership to the 
Nigerian government implies that they would have to bear eventual 
liabilities for such disused installations. Even in cases where the licensee 
or contractor may bear the burden of residual liabilities, the problem of 
future insolvency and cessation of such companies may entail that 
taxpayers bear the burden of residual liabilities. The article concludes 
with key recommendations on how to address the identified gaps using 
lessons from best practices such as United Kingdom, Norway and 
United States of America. One of such proposals is on the allocation of 
liability where there is a transfer of interest. Another is for joint and 
several or at least secondary liability of responsible parties even after 
decommissioning activities are over; a recommended provision to this 
effect is also provided. The third recommendation is on how time-
constrained residual liability can be used alongside lump sum payments 
to limit the State's financial exposure for decommissioning costs.  
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he origin of residual liability is decommissioning, which is 
the last stage of oil and gas operations.
1
 Decommissioning 
is a ‘set of activities to be undertaken to manage and dispose 
of installations and platforms and eliminate the environmental 
footprint, once a producing field … reaches the end of its 
economic life’.
2
   Given the latter, the primary objective of 
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      This paper is partially based on the study and work developed in the 
following publication: Eduardo G. Pereira, Alexandra Wawryk, 
Catherine Banet, Heike Trischmann, Keith Hall, Regulation of 
Decommissioning, Abandonment and Re-Use Initiatives in the Oil and 
Gas Industry: From Obligation to Opportunities (Kluwer 2020). 
1
  As an example, ‘Decommissioning means all work required for the 
abandonment of joint property in accordance with good oil field practice 
and applicable legal obligations, including, where required, plugging of 
wells, abandonment, disposal, demolition, removal and/or cleanup of 
facilities, and any necessary site remediation and restoration’. 
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) Model 
Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) 2012, Definitions. 
2
    World Bank Multi -Stakeholder Initiative: ‘Towards Sustainable De-  
      commissioning and Closure of Oil Fields and Mines, A Toolkit to Ass 
      -ist Government Agencies’ (March 2010) <http://documents.world ba  
      -nk. org/curated/en/417371468149083097/Towards-sustainabledeco-  
      -mmissioning-andclosure-of-oil-fields-and-mines-a-toolkit-to-assist    
      government-agencies> accessed 31
st
 August 2020. See also Juliet Kom-  
      ugisa and Ngozi Chinwa Ole, ‘Ugandan Legal Framework on Deco- 
T 
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decommissioning is the restoration of a site to its original 
condition before oil related activities,
3
 through the removal of 
infrastructure used during operations, in accordance with 
existing standards.
4
 However, total removal is not always 
possible. There are instances whereby the most efficient and 
practical option is to leave the disused infrastructure partly or 
fully in place.
5
 It is crucial that obligations (such as accidents, 
maintenance, insurance, environmental impacts
6
 etc.) arising 
from the infrastructure left in place are clearly defined. These 
obligations are referred to as residual liabilities.
7
 
This article seeks to address some of the issues that 
accompany residual liability, such as whether the 
decommissioning framework in Brazil, Nigeria, Trinidad & 
Tobago (hereafter T & T) are adequate to the extent that will 
guarantee that taxpayers do not bear the cost of 
decommissioning and the consequences of insolvency on 
residual liabilities. It analyses and gives recommendations on 
the position in the mentioned jurisdictions. A common thread 
between these countries is that they are relevant to oil and gas 
producers approaching decommissioning activities. This 
article's analysis is crucial in understanding how these 
countries can be better prepared to deal with the issues arising 
in the present economic climate and beyond. Some of the key 
issues addressed pertain to the allocation of liability post 
decommissioning, an evaluation of the international 
      ____________________________________________________ 
      mmissioning Fund: Is There an Achilles Heel, and Can Lessons from 
the UK Help?’ (2018) 16(2) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 3. 
3
    Michael Davar and Ben Holland, ‘Decommissioning Disputes’ in Marc 
Hammerson and Nicholas Antonas (eds), Oil and Gas Decommission-
ing: Law, Policy and Comparative Practice (2nd edn, Globe Law and 
Business 2016) 177. 
4
     Flávia Kaczelnik Altit and Mark Osa Igiehon, ‘Decommissioning of up 
-stream oil and gas facilities ’in Geoffrey Picton-Tuberville (ed), Oil and 
Gas: A Practical Handbook (Globe Law and Business 2009) 257-258. 
5
     Ngozi Chinwa Ole and Haman Philip Faga, ‘Assessing the Impact of the 
Brent Spar Incident on the Decommissioning Regime in the North-East 
Atlantic’ (2017) 3(2) Hasanuddin Law Review 141. 
6
  Tim Martin, ‘Decommissioning of International Petroleum Facilities 
Evolving Standards & Key Issues’ (2016) 1, 10 <http://timmartin.ca/ wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Decommissioning-of-Int-Petroleum-Facili-
ties-Martin2004.pdf> accessed 06 August 2020. 
7
     Pooja Chatterjee, ‘What are the Main Risks Facing a Host State when 
Designing a Regime for Offshore Decommissioning?’ (28 January 20 -
11) 1, 4 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=19158-
02 accessed 4
th
 August 2020. 
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framework, as well as the financial exposure of States where 
there are gaps in the relevant petroleum legislation as it relates 
to residual liabilities. A pertinent question is who is liable for 
the disused oil and gas infrastructure left in place. 
Recommendations will be put forward on these issues using 
guidance from international best practice in the United 
Kingdom (UK), United States of America (United States) and 




The article is divided into three sections. Section 1 
provides a brief introduction to decommissioning and 
obligations arising thereunder. Section 2 is on residual 
liabilities and is sub-divided into five parts. The first part looks 
at the nature of residual liabilities; the second explores key 
international and regional conventions relevant to the issue; 
the third part considers international best practices on 
decommissioning and residual liabilities; the fourth part 
explores current decommissioning practices in the three 
selected States; the last discussion in this section evaluates how 
current practices within each States can be affected by the 
insolvency of any party with decommissioning obligations. 
Section 3 provides key recommendations on how States 
should allocate residual liabilities, such that there is always a 
‘responsible party.’ Following this is the concluding section. 
 
2. RESIDUAL LIABILITY 
This section addresses the nature of a residual liability. It 
considers the responsible parties, the extent of the obligations 
and the implications thereof. 
2.1   The Nature of Residual Liability 
Residual liability is essentially about who is responsible for 
bearing any or all associated obligations for infrastructure left 
in place post-decommissioning. Ayoade defines this as 
‘accidental obligations occasioned after the decommissioning 
      ____________________________________________________ 
8
    PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC), ‘A Sea Change- the future of The 
      North Sea Oil & Gas ’(2016) <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/indu-
stries/assets/pwc-a-sea-change.pdf> accessed 12 November 2020. 
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and disposal of installations or pipelines.’
9
 In most 
jurisdictions, it is usually the case that residual liability lies 
with the owners, in the form of licensees/contractors, and not 
the State (although this might not always be the case,  
especially if the duration of the contract ends and the host 
government kept the area for another action or potential use). 
This approach ensures the State and its taxpayers, are not 
bearing any liabilities post decommissioning. Consequently, 
the State has a vested interest in ensuring that appropriate 
measures are put in place in the decommissioning framework 
to ensure that a responsible party's insolvency does not 
translate to taxpayers bearing the cost of any future liability 
from such residues. The adverse economic impacts of the 
ongoing COVID-19 crisis on licensees cannot be ignored as 
there is a heightened risk of insolvency.  
There are two competing interests where residual 
liabilities are concerned. The first is the interest of the State 
and the second, the interest of the licensees/contractors.
10
 The 
licensees would generally not want to bear residual liability in 
perpetuity since the disused infrastructure is not yielding any 
financial benefit.
11
 Conversely, the State typically would not 
want to be saddled with the liability of private actors. The 
approach to balancing the competing interests differs between 
States. For example, in the UK, the owner of an 
installation/pipeline, or the entities covered on section 29 
(which is fairly extensive and broad), retains residual liability 
in perpetuity.
12
 In contrast, the Norwegian position allows the 
      ____________________________________________________ 
9
   Morakinyo Adedayo Ayoade, Disused Offshore Installations and Pi-
pelines: Towards Sustainable Decommissioning (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague, 2002) 121. 
10
  Ngozi Chinwa Ole and others, ‘Decommissioning Oil and Gas Insta-
llations: The Challenge of Residual Liability’ in Eduardo G Peirera and 
others (eds) The Regulation of Decommissioning, Abandonment and 
Reuse Initiatives in the Oil and Gas Industry (Wolters Kluwer 2020) 151, 
155. 
11
   A. G. Kemp and L. Stephen, ‘Economic and Physical Aspects of Deco 
-mmissioning Offshore Structures ’in D J Gorman and J Nelson (eds), 
Decommissioning Offshore Structures (Springer 1998) 79, 114; John 
Paterson, ‘Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations ’in 
Greg Gordon, John Paterson, Emre Usenmez (eds) Oil and Gas Law: 
Current Practice and Emerging Trends (Dundee University Press 2
nd
 
edition 2011) 310. 
12
  BEIS, Guidance Notes: Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Installations and Pipelines (2011) 17:2, 17.5. Decommissioning of 
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State to take over residual liabilities in exchange for a lump 
sum by the licensees. Prior to an examination of the positions 
in these States, the next section assesses the international 
framework and standards on residual liability. This discussion 
is useful in setting the standards for the three selected states 
(Brazil, Nigeria and T & T). 
2.2    International Framework for Residual Liability 
The United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf 
1958 ('Geneva Convention') is the first major international 
effort pertaining to the removal of offshore installations. The 
key Article is 5(5) which provides that ‘…Any installations 
which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed’.
13
 
The latter provision ‘quickly fell into desuetude owing to the 
impracticability of total removal’ in all circumstances.
14
 The 
Convention has been superseded by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS). 
UNCLOS is the main international law on 
decommissioning.
15
 UNCLOS allows the partial removal of 
offshore installations, as opposed to total removal, provided 
generally accepted international standards are considered.
16
 
      ____________________________________________________ 
offshore oil and gas installations in the United Kingdom Continental 
Shelf is provided for in the Petroleum Act of 1998 (as amended by the 
Energy Act 2008) (United Kingdom). Additionally, Section 39 of the 
Petroleum Act empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations on 
decommissioning. Pursuant to the latter provisions, the DECC 
Guidance Notes on Decommissioning 2013 was made. See also Patricia 
Park, International Law and the Environment (CRC Press 2013) 212. 
13
   The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, Article 5(5).  
14
   Ngozi Chinwa Ole and Haman Philip Faga, Assessing the Impact of 
the Brent Spar Incident on the Decommissioning Regime in the North-
East Atlantic (2017) 3(2) Hansunaddin Law Review 142 
15
  Alan Boyle and David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable 
     Development: Past Achievements and the Future 290 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2001). 
16
  Article 60 (3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
     1982 provides that: 
‘Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be 
removed to ensure safety of navigation, considering any generally 
accepted international standards established in this regard by the 
competent international organization. Such removal shall also have due 
regard to fishing, the protection of the marine environment and the 
rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity shall be given to 
the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures not 
entirely removed’. 
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These standards are the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) Guidelines, (this is the second framework) which, 
although non-binding, are generally accepted international 
standards referred to in UNCLOS.
17
 Consequently, this 
permission for partial removal leads to circumstances where 
liabilities arise over disused infrastructure. Despite this, 
UNCLOS contains no provisions on residual liability. One 
might argue that this omission was intentional, with a view to 
allowing each State the discretion to legislate on it in its best 
interests. The IMO Guidelines require the total removal of 
disused installations by the Coastal States. However, there is 
scope to deviate from total removal provided circumstances in 
line with the IMO Guidelines can be shown to apply.
18
 The 
exception from total removal does not apply in all cases.
19
 In 
considering the impact of partial removal and, the associated 
residual liability, the IMO Guidelines provide that: 
The coastal State should ensure that legal title to 
installations and structures which have not been 
entirely removed from the sea-bed is unambiguous 
and that responsibility for maintenance and the 
financial ability to assume liability for future 
damages are clearly established.
20
 
This recommendation does not indicate how States should 
allocate residual liability, it simply points to States securing 
such allocation of liability in their own legislation or 
      ____________________________________________________ 
17
 David Testa, ‘Dealing with Decommissioning Costs of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Field Installations: An Appraisal of Existing Regimes ’(2014) 12(1) 
Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL) 1,7; EBN, ‘Netherlands 
masterplan for decommissioning and re-use’ (2016) <https://www. 
ebn.nl/wp content/uploads/2016/12/EBN-Master plan-for-decommissi 
oning.pdf> accessed 16
th
 September 2020. 
18
  These are listed in Articles 1.1, 3.1, 3.1.3, 3.2, 3.6, 3.11 of the IMO 
Guidelines. 
19
   Guideline 3.7 makes clear that ‘Installations or structures which no lon- 
ger serve the primary purpose for which they were originally designed 
or installed and are located in approaches to or in straits used for 
international navigation or routes used for international navigation 
through archipelagic waters, in customary deep-draught sea lanes, or in, 
or immediately adjacent to, routing systems, which have been adopted 
by the Organization should be entirely removed and should not be 
subject to any exceptions.’ 
20
   The IMO Guidelines, Article 3.11 
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regulations. Therefore, it is up to the relevant States to regulate 
such a critical matter.  
Additionally, there are a variety of regional conventions 
on decommissioning. Those directly relevant to the North Sea 
are the 1972 Oslo Convention; the 1991 OSCOM guidelines, 
and, the 1992 OSPAR Convention.
21
 In West Africa, the 
regional Convention to which Nigeria is a party, is the 
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the 
West and Central African Region (Abidjan Convention 
1984).
22
 Although the Convention has no specific reference to 
the decommissioning of offshore installations, Article 6 and 8 
do impose a general obligation on Contracting Parties to 
prevent and control the pollution of the sea bed.
23
 Another 
relevant convention is the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972 (London Convention). The aim of the Convention is ‘to 
promote the effective control of all sources of marine 
pollution and to take all practicable steps to prevent pollution 
of the sea by dumping of wastes and other matter’.
24
 
Overall, the key international frameworks above have 
very little to say on residual liability. In fact, the most 
accomplished reference, albeit indirect, is the IMO Guidelines 
      ____________________________________________________ 
21
  The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic 1992 (hereafter OSPAR). From its title, this is a 
regional convention that affects the UK North Sea. OSPAR Decision 
98/3 <https://www.ospar.org/work-areas/oic/installations> accessed 10 
June 2020. 
22
   ‘In 2008, the Contracting Parties agreed to amend the title of the Abid- 
jan Convention and the Protocol to: “Convention for Cooperation in 
the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the West, Central and 
Southern Africa Region and Protocol concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency.’ International Waters 
Governance, ‘Abidjan Convention’ <http://www.internationalwaters-
governance.com/apps/search?q=abidjan+convention> accessed 03 Ju-ly 
2020. 
23
   ibid, Tim Martin, ‘Decommissioning of International Petroleum Facili- 
ties Evolving Standards & Key Issues ’(2016) 1, 7 <http://timmartin.ca 
/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Decommissioning-of-Int-Petroleum-
Facilities-Martin2004.pdf> accessed 06 June 2020. 
24
  International Maritime Organization, 'Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972’ 
<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Pages/defaul
t.aspx> accessed 18 July 2020. 
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Article 3.11. This is as far as it goes. Consequently, States 
looking to international frameworks for guidance on how to 
approach residual liability will be disappointed. The first 
hurdle is for States to become a signatory to the relevant 
frameworks so as to have a common international standard. 
The second hurdle is how to allocate residual liability in view 
of the limited guidance. Nonetheless, Article 3.11 of the IMO 
Guidelines offer a starting point for States: liability must be 
appropriately assigned from the start, in order to avoid 
disputes and challenges on costs 
2.3   International Best Practices on Decommissioning and 
Residual Liabilities 
The regulation of decommissioning and residual liabilities in 
the UK, Norway and United States are considered best 
practices because these countries have mature oil and gas 
basins with decommissioning experience, as well as a robust 
legislative framework on decommissioning.
25
 The UK and 
Norway are party to the UNCLOS and OSPAR 
Conventions.
26
 The UK, Norway and United States 
experience with the regulation of residual liabilities will be 
considered in order to extrapolate the benchmark for 
analysing the practices in Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, and 
Brazil.   
Oil and gas rights in the UK are granted through a licence. 
The Petroleum Act 1998 is the relevant legislation concerning 
this.
27
 It is not uncommon for large or complex licenses to be 
exploited by multiple parties in the form of a joint operating 
      ____________________________________________________ 
25
  Ann Scarborough Bull and Milton S. Love, ‘Worldwide Oil and Gas 
Platform Decommissioning: A Review of Practices and Reefing Optio- 
ns’ (2019) 168 Ocean and Coastal Management 274, 275. See also John 
Paterson, ‘Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation on the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf in the Aftermath of the Macondo Disaster’ 
(2015-2016) 4 LSU J. Energy L. & Resources 271. 
26
   The USA is party to UNCLOS, but it has not ratified it (as at the time 
of writing). United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’ <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21& 
Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en> accessed 16 August 2020. 
27
  Efe Azaino, ‘International Decommissioning Obligations: Are There 
Lessons Nigeria can Acquire from the UK’s Legal and Regulatory 
Framework?’ (2013) 16 CEPML Annual Review 117. 





decommissioning costs are like any other costs in the JOA, 
such that each party is typically liable according to its 
participating interest.
29
 However, decommissioning liability 
vis-à-vis third parties operates under the concept of joint and 
several liabilities.
30
 Under this, any person issued with a 
section 29 notice under Part IV of the Petroleum Act 1998 to 
prepare a decommissioning programme could potentially be 
liable for the entire costs. Parties seek to mitigate this through 
the provision of security whereby each party contributes 
towards its share of the estimated costs of decommissioning. 
An innovation from this is the Decommissioning Security 
Agreement (hereafter DSA), the aim of which is to ensure that 
guaranteed funds will be available to cover the costs of 
decommissioning.
31
 The provision of security seeks to ensure 
that before decommissioning, each licensee has contributed 
security to cover its share of the estimated costs. Therefore, 
even if a party becomes insolvent at any time before 




      ____________________________________________________ 
28
   Christopher Duval and others, International Petroleum Exploration  
      and Exploitation Agreements: Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects (2nd 
edn., Barrows Company 2009) 285. 
29
   As an example, The AIPN Model JOA 2012, Exhibit E Decommissi-
oning Procedures: Section 4.1 on Trust Fund Cash Calls provides that, 
‘[u]nless unanimously approved otherwise, each Party shall bear the 
Decommissioning Costs proportionally to its respective Participating 
Interest’. (emphasis added). 
30
   The concept of joint and several liability is made clear in UK Decom-
missioning guidance notes. See Department of Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), ‘Guidance Notes: Decommissioning of Offshore Oil 
and Gas Installations and Pipelines under the Petroleum Act 1998’ 




 August 2020. 
31
   Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘Guidance Notes: Deco- 
      mmissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations and Pipelines under 
the Petroleum Act 1998’ (March 2011) 1, 117 <https://www.gov.uk/-
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69754/Gui
dance_Notes_v6_07.01.2013.pdf> accessed 20 March 2017; Scott C 
Styles, ‘Joint Operating Agreements’ in Gordon G and others (eds), Oil 
and Gas Law- Current Practice and Emerging Trends (2nd edn, Dundee 
University Press 2011) 407. 
32
   The DSA protects the security of an insolvent party in a trust until the 
time to expend decommissioning costs — such funds would not be 
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Part IV of the Petroleum Act 1998, and the Guidance 
Notes, provide that the responsible parties for the 
decommissioning of disused offshore oil and gas installations 
shall be such parties as those upon whom a section 29 notice 
can be served.
33
 This includes existing licensees, historical 
licensees, managers of the installation, parties receiving a 
beneficial interest from the exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons at the installation and parent companies.
34
 
Nevertheless, despite this wide range, section 29 notice would 
typically be issued to the operator of the installation and 
parties having a beneficial interest (financial or otherwise) in 
the installation or pipeline.
35
 The Petroleum Act does not refer 
      ____________________________________________________ 
available to general creditors of the insolvent party. This protection was 
included in section 38A of the Petroleum Act 1998, as amended by the 
Energy Act 2008. <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 
200708/ldbills/086/08086.61-67.html> accessed 16 July 2020. 
33
   Section 30 of Part IV of the UK Petroleum Act 1998 gives the Secreta-ry 
of State power to issue the section 29 notice to a wide net of perso-ns- 
The section 29 notice may be served to a number of people listed under 
section 30 (1) of the UK Petroleum Act 1998 as: 
      ‘(a) the person having the management of the installation or of its main  
structure. 
      (b) a person to whom subsection (5) applies in relation to the insta-llation 
[subsection (5) refers to a person who has the right to exploit or 
explore mineral resources in any area]. 
     (c) a person outside paragraphs (a) and (b) who is a party to a joint 
operating agreement or similar agreement relating to rights by virtue of 
which a person is within paragraph (b). 
     (d) a person outside paragraphs (a) to (c) who owns any interest in the 
installation otherwise than as security for a loan; 
     (e) a company which is outside paragraphs (a) to (d) but is associated with 
a company within any of those paragraphs.’ <http://www.legis-
lation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/17/part/IV> accessed 04 June 2020. 
34
   ibid. 
35
  Judith Aldersey-Williams, ‘Decommissioning security’ in Marc Ham-
merson and Nicholas Antonas (ed), Oil and Gas Decommissioning: 
Law, Policy and Comparative Practice (2nd edition, Globe Law and 
Business 2016) 88. The Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) Guidance Notes on Decommissioning Offshore Oil and Gas 
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to residual liability. Yet, according to the Guidance notes of 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (hereafter 
DECC),
36
 owners of installation or a section 29 notice holder, 
at the time of decommissioning, will bear any accompanying 
residual liability in perpetuity.
37
 
The notion of residual liability in perpetuity is a curious one. 
It will not always be the case that the companies of the 
licensees remain perpetually in operation, nor that, such 
owners will remain solvent. Therefore, there may be a gap in 
the ownership of a structure over a prolonged period, with the 
State having to bear residual liability. Admittedly, the 
application of joint and several liability mitigates the State's 
risk where one or more owners is no longer in operation or 
becomes insolvent. In such a case, the remaining owners are 
responsible for residual liability.  
Similarly, in Norway, under the Petroleum Act ‘If there 
are more than one party liable according to the first or second 
paragraph, they shall be jointly and severally liable for 
financial obligations, unless otherwise decided by the 
Ministry’.
38
 A party assigning its participating interest in the 
licence will remain secondarily liable to the remaining 
licensees for the cost of decommissioning if the assignee does 
not cover the full costs of its share of decommissioning.
39
 
Petroleum activities in Norway are regulated principally by 
Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities 
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(Norway Petroleum Act).
40
 The law provides that licensees 
and owners of disused infrastructure have responsibility for 
the residual liabilities arising from disused oil and gas 
infrastructures.
41
 Similar to the UK practice, the Norway 
position gives a wide range of options on who will be 
responsible for residual liabilities that may arise from disused 
installations. Thus, it thins out the possibilities of taxpayers 
bearing the liabilities that may arise from such residue. 
Despite, the common position on joint and several liability 
between the UK and Norway, the position of the latter on 
residual liability is more flexible than the former. The Norway 
Petroleum Act allows for the State to take over such liabilities 
in return for a lump sum payment. Section 5-4 provides: 
In the event of decisions for abandonment, it may 
be agreed between the licensees and the owners on 
one side and the State on the other side that future 
maintenance, responsibility and liability shall be 
taken over by the State based on an agreed financial 
compensation. 
The Norwegian approach is commendable for taking the 
burden of perpetual liabilities off the shoulders of companies 
while still ensuring, to a practicable extent, that taxpayers do 
not bear eventual liability for it. The view taken by the 
Norwegian Oil Industry is that the lump sum is overly 
burdensome on the industry, particularly in the light of the 
fact that the calculation of residual liabilities is imprecise and 
unpredictable.
42
 However, these concerns must be balanced 
against the State's duty to ensure it is not underestimating the 
potential costs. Admittedly, there will be instances where the 
actual residual liability is significantly lower than the lump 
sum. Yet, there will also be cases where the actual costs exceed 
the lump sum. The State takes the burden and the benefit of 
either outcome. Similarly, the licensees and owners also take 
the burden of paying an onerous lump sum, together with the 
benefit of making a clean break from future liabilities. 
Although the United States is fairly unique with private 
ownership of subsoil rights, it does not differ on offshore areas 
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as the said ownership is vested on the relevant regional 
government or federal government.
43
 The laws that govern 
decommissioning and residual liabilities in the United States 
are the Outer Continental Shelf Act (OCSLA) 1969, 30 CFR 
250, Subpart Q Decommissioning Activities 2012 and the 
National Artificial Reefs Plan, 2007.
44
 The OCSLA 1969 
provides for complete removal as the primary option of 
decommissioning.
45
 The leaseholders are jointly and severally 
responsible and liable for decommissioning obligations 
(including in an assignment).
46
 However, the United States 
offers another approach to deal with such matter which is 
called rig-to-reefs program.
47
 The main idea behind such a 
program is to repurpose the infrastructure from an oil and gas 
platform into an artificial reef.
48
 Certain measures and 
requirements should be met in order to qualify for the national 
rig-to-reefs (including safety of navigation as well as a variety 
of environmental protections).
 49
 The leaseholders might have 
to contribute financially towards such process to convert the 
platform into the artificial program. Once the process is 
completed, the liability for the residues would be the 
responsibility of the State. Although such approach is not 
widely used outside the United States, it provides an efficient 
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The common theme that runs through the practices in the 
UK, Norway, and the United States is the extra measures 
taken to ensure that responsibility for residual liabilities is not 
borne by taxpayers. This is either by expanding the scope of 
liabilities beyond the current license or leaseholders or by 
providing for the transfer of ownership of the residues to the 
State for value. While these practices are not perfect, they set 
a fairly good standard on how to ensure as far as practicable 
that the responsibilities for residual liabilities are catered for. 
Having considered the positions in the UK, Norway, and the 
United States, the next section assesses the practices of the 
three selected countries on residual liabilities.  
2.4    Brazilian, Nigerian, Trinidad and Tobago practices on 
residual liability  
Brazil, Nigeria and T & T are asset basins with offshore 
platforms and subsea equipment reaching end of life. Despite 
this, these countries have limited decommissioning 
experience. This section examines the current position on 
residual liabilities in these countries, evaluating any legislative 
gaps and providing recommendations for improvement. All 
three States have ratified UNCLO 
3.4.1    Brazil
51
 
Brazil ranks at the top ten countries with the largest oil and 
natural gas reserves in the world.
52
 Oil was first discovered in 
1930, in the State of Bahia,
53
 northeast of Brazil, with most of 
its current reserves located in offshore fields.
54
 Petrobras - a 
mixed capital company controlled by the Brazilian 
Government - had the monopoly over the exploration and 
production activities in Brazil until the Constitutional 
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amendment # 9/1995. Article 177 of the Brazilian Constitution 
grants the Federal Government the possibility of contracting 
with private parties over the exploitation of the relevant 
natural resources under the conditions to be detailed by 
further legislation. This gave way to the enactment of Federal 
Law No. 9.478/1997 (the Petroleum Law), which regulates 
Article 177 of the Brazilian Constitution and created the 
Brazilian oil and gas regulator, the National Agency of Oil, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels (hereinafter referred to as ANP).
55
     
The Petroleum Law of 1997 is the principal law that governed 
the petroleum industry in Brazil.
56
 Under the Petroleum Law, 
the concession regime was the only form of granting 
petroleum and natural gas rights. In 1998, the so-called ANP 
Round Zero ratified, by means of concession contracts, 
Petrobras' rights over the producing fields and granted a three 
years period to continue exploration, appraisal and 
development of areas where either commercial discoveries or 
exploration investments were made.
57
  
However, the Pre-Salt Law No. 12.351/2010 and, the 
Transfer of Rights Law No. 12.351/2010 were enacted in 
2010.
58
 The former provides that the exploration and 
production of reserves located in the pre-salt and strategic 
areas would be subject to the PSA regime.
59
 The latter 
12.276/2010 established a mechanism whereby the Brazilian 
Government directly transferred (without any auction) to 
Petrobras - the right to produce up to 5 billion barrels of oil 
and natural gas in a specified prolific area of the pre-salt 
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province.
60
 In exchange, the Brazilian Government increased 
its participation in the Petrobras' stock capital through the 
acquisition of debt bonds issued for this purpose by 
Petrobras.
61
 Over the last few years, it was discovered that 
these areas held far more than the 5 billion barrels in 
recoverable reserves. Such surplus volumes were offered 
through the PSA regime in a bid round held in November 
2019. Although this bid round resulted in a record of 
approximately USD 11.6 billion (70 billion Brazilian Reais) in 
upfront payments of signature bonuses, only the areas of 
Búzios and Itapu were awarded (with the minimum profit oil 
share to the Brazilian Government) out of four offered areas. 
Brazil is a party to UNCLOS, the London Convention of 
1972, as well as being a signatory to the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, 1989.
62
 The country is relatively 
new to decommissioning, with it becoming a more prominent 
issue as fields reach maturity. Currently, there are 158 
production units installed throughout the coast, of which 42% 
of these have been in operation for over 25 years and are fast 
approaching decommissioning.
63
 Thus far, the ANP has 
approved 20 decommissioning projects.
64
 Petrobras is 
especially in a delicate position regarding decommissioning, 
considering the lifecycle of its mature fields as it previously 
owned all of the country's production units during the 
monopoly period, as detailed above. 
There are different regulations about this matter, such as 
ANP Resolutions 43/2007, 41/2015 and 46/2016. The general 
rule is that all liabilities under the Brazilian granting 
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instruments, the Petroleum Law and Pre-Salt Law is that the 
concessionaire(s) or contractor(s) will bear the costs of 
decommissioning under a joint and several liability basis.
 
 The most recent regulatory update on decommissioning 
operations are currently regulated by the ANP Resolution # 
817/2020.
65
 This Resolution contains no express provision on 
residual liability, which is unsurprising, given that the sector 
is relatively new to decommissioning. However, on general 
decommissioning obligations, both the Petroleum Law and 
the Pre-Salt Law provide that, at the end of the concession 
contract or production sharing agreement, ‘the 
concessionaire(s) and contractor(s) shall remove the 
equipment and goods, which are not subject to the reversion 
to Federal Government, and will be obliged to repair or 
indemnify damages arising out of its activities, as well as to 
carry out any environment recovery demanded by the relevant 
authorities’.
66
 The implication of the latter provision is that 
any disused installations remaining after decommissioning 
would have reverted back to the Federal Government. A 
natural incidence of such reversion is that the residual 
liabilities arising from such disused installations would be 
borne by the Brazilian government. This stands in contrast to 
the analysed best practices regimes and their own basic 
principle where the residual liabilities for disused facilities are 
clearly defined to be borne principally by the 
concessionaires/contractors and, secondarily by the State for 
value pecuniary compensation. 
The Petroleum Law 1997 provides that: 
The return of areas, as well as the reversion of 
facilities, will not imply any expenses whatsoever 
for the Federal Government or for the ANP, nor do 
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they entitle the concessionaire to any indemnity for 
services, wells, buildings and returned goods, which 
must become a property of the Federal 
Government, and will be administered by the ANP, 
as per item VI of art 43.
67
 
A liberal interpretation of this provision may entail the 
regulator requiring the Concessionaire or Contractor to pay a 
lump sum to the Federal Government for any perceived future 
residual liabilities that may arise from the disused installations. 
Resolution ANP #785/2019 provides that assignors remain 
jointly and severally liable with assignees for 
decommissioning obligations and costs.
68
 Such resolution 
further adds that the joint and several liabilities is only 
applicable to obligations that were either constituted prior to 
the assignment or after the assignment but related to activities 
performed before the assignment. The mentioned provisions 
may imply that liability for such lump sum will be jointly and 
severally between concessionaires and previous owners i.e. 
assignors.   
However, a more daring interpretation may limit the 
definition of expenses in the stated provision to exclude 
residual liabilities. The implication is that the State might be 
liable for the decommissioning obligations of the returned 
area without any compensation. By extension, it would also 
bear the residual liabilities for any of such disused oil and gas 
installations not completely removed. The use of ‘any 
expenses whatsoever’ does lend to the more robust 
interpretation.  
In addition, the wording of the mentioned resolution is 
not completely clear, this asks the question - should the extent 
of the obligations as between assignors and assignees only 
apply to infrastructure that was already in place as at the time 
of the assignment? There is a reasonable argument that the 
assignor should only be jointly and several liable with the 
assignee for facilities and equipment that were in place at the 
assignment date and consequently a part of the assignment. 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that all facilities and 
equipment pre and post assignment are connected to the area 
subject to the assignment and therefore joint and several 
liability for decommissioning ought to apply. The Brazilian 
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oil & gas regulator (i.e. ANP) has yet to give its view on such 
scenarios, but from a risk mitigation point of view, it would 
favour the latter approach where joint and several liability 
extends post assignment. Such that, in the event that the 
assignee is unable to perform decommissioning obligations, 
the assignor can be clawed back to fulfil such obligations. 
Ultimately, the decision would be down to the facts of each 
case. Guidance from the ANP on these areas would be 
welcome— albeit that may not come until it is necessitated by 
a relevant future occurrence. 
Overall, Brazil's decommissioning framework is on a 
good start and evolved over the years (including with further 
regulations and contractual obligations). However, as 
discussed above, there are gaps, which should be filled in order 
to minimize the possibilities of taxpayers shouldering the 




Nigeria is the largest oil producer and has the largest natural 
gas reserves in Africa.
70
 It remains one of the world economies 
heavily reliant on revenue from the petroleum sector,
71
 with 
its non–oil revenue contributing only 9.50% towards its 
GDP.
72
 The first discovery of oil in Nigeria dates back to 1956 
in Oloibiri (a remote village) in the Niger Delta.
73
 Nigeria has 
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over 175 installations with increasing prospects for more 
installations given newer discoveries.
74
 Decommissioning of 
offshore installations has not commenced in Nigeria.
75
 
The 1969 Petroleum Act is the primary legislation 
governing decommissioning, with the production sharing 
contract (hereafter PSC) being a common method of granting 
petroleum rights.
76
 The Petroleum Act does not have a specific 
provision on decommissioning. However, section 9 grants 
powers to the petroleum Minister to make regulations 
pertaining to the prevention of pollution in the waters and the 
environment.
77
 Although, a variety of legislation includes 
provisions that are relevant for decommissioning,
78
 the most 
important legal instrument in the decommissioning of 
offshore installations in Nigeria is the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry 
1991(hereafter EGASPIN). Nigeria has ratified UNCLOS, 
the London Convention 1972 and the Abidjan Convention 
1984.
79
 The 2002 revision of EGASPIN is based on IMO 
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 It has further been revised in 2018 Part VIII-H.
81
 
Section 2 of EGASPIN provides specific guidelines for 
decommissioning offshore facilities, as well as in inland and 
nearshore areas.
82
 It provides that from January 2
nd
, 2003, no 
oil and gas installations should be placed in Nigerian marine 
areas unless its design was such as to allow for complete 
removal.
83
 Thus, for installations that will fall into the 
mentioned category, the issue of residual liabilities might not 
arise given that complete removal should be the natural 
option. On the other hand, for installations that were placed 
before January 2
nd
, 2003, it recommends complete removal to 
the extent that they are 'in less than 100 meters (depth) of 
water and weighing less than 4000 tonnes in air'.
84
 For every 
other installation that do not fit in the latter category, the State 
can acquire such installations after the expiration of the license 
or PSCs.
85
 The legal framework for decommissioning is silent 
on who would bear the residual liabilities for such abandoned 
disused installations.  
From a contractual point, exploration and production 
contracts also include decommissioning obligations.
86
 At the 
initial point of the oil industry, the federal government had 
compulsorily acquired up to 55% of the equity interests in oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria by means of joint venture 
agreements.
87
 The state oil company, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was saddled with the 
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responsibility of managing the government equity interests in 
such oil and gas industries.
88
 However, the NNPC was quite 
often defaulting in fulfilling its own financial obligations 
under the joint ventures, such as cash calls.
89
 Thus, there was 
a natural migration to PSCs, which takes away the financial 




The PSC is now the dominant form through which the 
State grants petroleum rights.
91
 There is a 1993, 2000, and 2005 
Model PSC. The oldest Model PSC does not unsurprisingly 
include decommissioning obligations. However, both 2002 
and 2005 versions of the Model PSC incorporate 
decommissioning obligations. The Contractor is responsible 
for decommissioning and, is required to provide 
decommissioning security— to ensure there are funds 
available to cover the costs of decommissioning.
92
 This 
security could be in the form of a bank guarantee, letter of 
credit, or in the form of establishing a decommissioning fund, 
which would be held in an escrow account.
93
 On the issue of 
assignment of interests, the assignor only remains liable for its 
decommissioning obligations that accrued before the transfer, 
whilst the assignee's liability for decommissioning only 
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However, the PSC is silent on residual liabilities, but it is 
implied that the government through NNPC will bear 
liabilities arising from such abandoned installations. None of 
the 1993, 2000, or 2005 Model PSCs provide for who has the 
responsibility for future liabilities that may arise from 
abandoned oil and gas installations. The Model PSCs provide 
that the ownership of abandoned oil and gas installations shall 
be vested on NNPC.
95
 The implication is that NNPC will 
remain the owner of such residue and as such, will be liable for 
any future liabilities arising from it.
96
 As such, it can be sued 




The issue of limited existence may affect the possibility of 
NNPC assuming the responsibilities for any liabilities arising 
from such disused installations. The point has been made that 
corporate bodies do not have perpetual existence. As such, 
abandoned disused installations may outlive them. The 
NNPC is a corporate body having the capacity to sue and be 
sued.
98
 Thus, it is imminent that it will not be available forever 
to assume the responsibilities for such residues. For instance, 
before 1977, the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) 
was the state oil company.
99
 NNOC was dissolved by the 
NNPC Act of 1977.
100
 Thus, NNPC will one day cease to 
exist while such abandoned oil and gas installations will still 
be there. The fact that NNPC is owned by the government 
may mean that they will ultimately assume responsibilities for 
such residues when the former ceases to exist. 
All in all, the decommissioning framework in Nigeria 
needs improvement, although some credit must be given for 
its evolution over the years especially the complete removal 
rule. A major issue is the absence of clarity on who would bear 
in perpetuity the residual liabilities of such disused 
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installations. Thus, there is the risk that it will ultimately be 
borne by the government. 
2.4.3   Trinidad and Tobago
101
 
Trinidad and Tobago (T & T) is the largest oil and gas 
producer in the Caribbean.
102
 Its first discovery of oil was in 
1867
103
 - from there it has come a long way in its exploration 
and production activities. At the time of writing, its 
cumulative production totalled over 3 billion barrels of oil.
104
 
The energy sector plays a significant role in the long-term 
economic growth of the country, with around 34.9% of the 
country's GDP coming from this sector.
105
 As with Nigeria, 
the decommissioning of offshore facilities has not commenced 
in T & T.
106
 
Oil and gas activities are governed principally by the 
Petroleum Act 1969 and the Petroleum Regulations.
107
 The 
government regulates the grant of upstream concessions 
through PSCs; E&P Public Petroleum Rights Licences; E&P 
Private Petroleum Rights Licences; and Exploration 
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 The position of the Act is that at the expiration of 
licenses, the licensee shall deliver to the Minister of Energy 
and Energy Industries all assets used in production ‘…in good 
order, repair and condition, and fit for further utilisation (fair 
wear and tear excepted)…’.
109
 However, the Act is silent on 
who will bear the residual liabilities for such abandoned 
installations whose ownership has already been transferred to 
the government. The incidence of ‘ownership of such disused 
installations’ implies that the government, by extension 
taxpayers would shoulder responsibility for the residual 
liabilities arising from such abandoned disused installations. It 
is essential that these provisions are reviewed, with the State 
either deciding to bear residual liability in exchange for a lump 
sum by licensees (Norwegian position), or that the burden of 
residual liability is allocated to the licensees who should have 
some form of financial guarantee in the event of its non-
existence. 
Section 6(3) of the Petroleum Act provides that the 
Minister shall have the power to enter into petroleum 
operations upon such terms and conditions as the government 
will approve. Over time, the latter provisions have given rise 
to some model PSCs. The first Model PSC in 1974 did not 
provide for decommissioning. However, the Model PSC 2012 
includes decommissioning provisions, one of which is that the 
Contractor must carry out a decommissioning programme to 
the satisfaction of the Minister for installations and 
pipelines.
110
 The Contractor is expected to set up a fund 
accessible to the Minister, which will cover the costs of 
decommissioning and environmental pollution.  
Concerning installations abandoned, the 2012 PSC 
provides that the ownership shall pass to the Minister except 
in cases where the latter notifies the Contractor that 'he does 
not accept the particular asset'.
111
 It further adds that ‘where 
the ownership of any assets passes to the Minister, from the 
date of such transfer Contractor shall have no further rights in 
and shall be released from all responsibility and liability for 
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the asset unless it can be proven that liability arises from a 
defect that existed at the date of the passing of such 
ownership’.
112
 Given that residual liabilities arise after 
decommissioning, it would appear that the Contractor will be 
excused from it. Thus, the government would have to bear 
eventual liability for such residues.  
The Model PSC is silent on what will happen if the 
Minister refuses the ownership of such disused installations as 
provided for.
113
 It can be implied that the ownership of the 
installations will remain with the contractor who will be 
responsible for any residual liabilities arising from such 
disused installations. It has already been pointed out that in 
comparison to the State, companies have very limited 
existence. In the event that the companies (contractor) cease to 
exist or becomes insolvent, the government may have to 
shoulder the residual liabilities of such disused installations. 
The 2012 Model PSC provides that ‘no assignment shall in 
any way absolve the assignor from the obligations undertaken 
by it under the contract except to the extent that such 
obligations are in fact performed by the assignee’.
114
 The same 
is contained in the Petroleum Regulations, Regulation 29(3).
115
 
Therefore, the assignor can be required to carry out 
decommissioning obligations should its assignee fail to or be 
unable to. In reality, at the time of the transfer, the assignee 
may well be in a position to discharge its decommissioning 
obligations, but the reverse may be the case at the actual time 
of decommissioning. The oil and gas industry is particularly 
volatile and given to extreme changes; as such, an oil and gas 
major may end up insolvent within twenty years. This is the 
same position in the UK where the Secretary of State through 
the BEIS can call back a former licensee to complete 
decommissioning obligations under section 29. In a bid to 
mitigate the financial risks of decommissioning, parties to the 
licensee and or JOA often enter into field-wide DSAs. 
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With respect to residual liabilities, the assignor may still be 
held responsible for the residues of disused installations. The 
point has been made that the 2012 Model PSC provides that 
no assignment shall absolve the assignor from obligations 
undertaken by it under the PSC unless such obligations have 
been performed by the assignee. As reiterated, the contractor 
may be responsible for the residual liabilities arising from such 
disused installations in instances where the Minister refuses to 
take ownership. The position on assignment may mean that 
the assignor of the facilities may bear the liabilities for such 
residues. The mentioned will be the case if the assignee is 
insolvent or has ceased to exist. If the latter is the case, there is 
a reduced probability that both assignee and assignor would 
be insolvent at the same time. Regardless, it is not expressly 
stated even though it may be implied. Again, the provision on 
assignment is not a panacea to residual liability falling back on 
the State in the event of the inevitable cessation or insolvency 
of the contractor companies or assignee. 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that T&T's 
decommissioning framework takes account of some of key 
issues involving decommissioning activities. It includes an 
abandonment programme as well as the setting up of a 
decommissioning fund. However, the provisions relating to 
residual liabilities are defective in several perspectives. The 
government and by extension taxpayers would have to 
shoulder the residual liabilities of disused installations 
emanating from the activities of private entities who are 
licensees and contractors. Even in cases where such 
contractors may be responsible for residual liabilities, they 
would come a time where such liability would shift to the 
government in event of the cessation of affected companies. 
Going forward, T & T can enhance its decommissioning 
framework by clarifying the residual liability issue and the re-
use of abandoned infrastructure should be considered in its 
framework. 
2.4.4    How can insolvency affect such a procedure?  
The volatility of crude oil prices combined with ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic is likely to lead to insolvency on the 
part of some oil and gas companies as we have seen (between 
January- June 2020) with the cases of Sable Permian 










 Lilis Energy Inc and much more, according 
to a recent report by Haynes and Boone.
120
 Prior to the onset 
of the pandemic, the oil price averaged around $60 per barrel 
in November 2019.
121
 The unexpected and destabilising 
impact of the pandemic saw the oil price fall into negative 
dollar values per barrel in April 2020.
122
 The current normal 
for oil prices are an average of $20 to $40 per barrel.
123
 It is fair 
to say that COVID-19 might change the oil market for an 
indefinite time. The crisis will have varying, but no doubt 
severe financial impacts on oil and gas companies globally. 
Although the market is showing signs of improvement, only 
time will tell the extent of the economic devastation on oil and 
gas companies. Consequently, long before insolvencies begin, 
States need to evaluate their legislative and regulatory 
framework on decommissioning and the allocation of residual 
liability. 
This raises the question; how can insolvency affect the 
relevant procedures pertaining to residual liability? In the UK, 
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liability for costs will pass to the other joint venturers if one 
party becomes insolvent (including historical license holders). 
The same principle will apply post decommissioning. In 
Norway, any insolvency on the part of the licensees and 
owners is not relevant for the purposes of residual liability 
where the State has residual liability (in exchange for a lump 
sum). However, in both the UK and Norway, any remaining 
solvent owners/licensees might be responsible for covering 
the shortfall of the insolvent party as it pertains to residual 
liability. If there are no solvent owners, the responsibility will 
fall to the State even though the UK system allows a far more 
reaching historical liability.  
In Brazil, the assignor is only privately absolved before 
the assignee (not before the governmental authorities or third 
parties) from decommissioning liabilities if the assignee agrees 
with it in the farm-out agreement (FOA) or share and 
purchase agreement (SPA). The joint and several liability on 
decommissioning obligations and costs before the 
governmental authorities will remain regardless of the 
existence of any provisions in the private contract for the sale 
of the assignor participating interest in a certain asset 
exempting the assignor for such liabilities and costs. 
Therefore, any insolvency on the part of the assignee would 
simply claw back the assignor, provided it is still solvent. As 
previously discussed, guidance from the government or 
regulator is needed as to the extent of the assignor's liability 
for decommissioning. Nigeria demarcates the extent of 
liabilities between assignee and assignor from the date of 
transfer; as such, an assignee insolvency will not necessarily 
impact the assignor, unless it pertains to decommissioning 
obligations that accrued before the transfer. This may prove 
more difficult to distinguish in practice. 
An attempt by the State to fully insulate itself from 
residual liabilities for decommissioning may not always be 
practical, given that it is the only entity in the transaction that 
has a sufficient degree of permanence. Therefore, it may be 
more realistic to limit licensees/contractors' residual liability 
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3. CONCLUSION 
States should be cognisant of the fact that there is no risk-free 
alternative where residual liabilities are concerned, but the 
considerations raised invite States to re-examine their financial 
exposure and consequently that of taxpayers. The ability of 
each State to respond to the issues identified will have a 
significant effect at the time of decommissioning or long after 
decommissioning activities.  
In examining the decommissioning framework of the 
selected States and the implications for residual liability, this 
paper identified the allocation of responsibility between the 
State and the contractors/licensees. It evaluated whether such 
allocation could saddle the State with the costs for residual 
liabilities arising over disused infrastructure. Also, the 
discussion considered the position of the State where there 
was an assignment of interest and the assignee is unable to 
fulfil its obligations for decommissioning, as well as residual 
liabilities. For instance, the article identified that the position 
in Brazil is unclear on whether the obligations of the assignor 
only apply to installations in place as at the time of assignment. 
It was however suggested that from a risk mitigation 
perspective for the State, the preferred approach is for the 
assignor’s decommissioning obligation to apply pre and post 
assignment so that it remains jointly liable with the assignee. 
Similarly, in Nigeria, the assignor is only liable for obligations 
arising up until the time of assignment. This exposes the State 
to financial risk where the assignee is unable to fulfil its 
decommissioning obligations. 
The recommendations proffered address the weaknesses 
identified in the relevant provisions of each State. One of such 
proposals is the use of provisions which make responsible 
parties liable for residual liability in perpetuity. The 
application of residual liability in perpetuity has its appeal. 
However, in reality, there is a probability that the responsible 
parties are insolvent before or indeed post decommissioning. 
Therefore, it may be more practical to have residual liability 
apply for a specific period (let´s say 40 years as suggested in 
the recommendation section) and then any resulting residual 
liability is borne by the State—who remains permanent—in 
exchange for a lump sum or on the basis of the actual costs 
plus interest. Another recommendation is on the use of 
financial assurances. 
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Lastly, all three States should also consider the re-use, 
repurposing and recycle of infrastructure in their 
decommissioning regulation, as there are environmental and 
financial benefits to this.  
4. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
ENSURING RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
RESIDUAL LIABILITIES 
Decommissioning is a challenging period as there is no more 
oil and gas to be produced. However, the relevant 
stakeholders face a significant amount of work, costs and risks 
to complete the required decommissioning project. This is 
why it is essential to put in place enough collaterals and 
guarantees in order to secure enough funds to cover the 
relevant costs to implement the said decommissioning.  
In any case, if any infrastructure is partially or totally left 
in situ (to the extent it is allowed and consistent with the 
applicable laws), then the residual liability becomes a key 
concern for the stakeholders. Who is going to be liable for 
such infrastructure, and what kind of guarantees are put in 
place to secure the environment and taxpayers? A number of 
recommendations are proposed, in view of the weaknesses 
identified in the decommissioning framework of the three 
selected States and using guidance from international best 
practices. 
One way through which the UK and Norway mitigate 
financial risks for residual liability is through the application 
of joint and several liability of licensees/joint venturers.
124
 
Although in Norway, this issue is not relevant where the 
contractors make a lump sum payment to the State, in return 
for a clean break from residual liabilities. The benefit of joint 
liability is that in the event of an insolvency, the solvent 
responsible parties would be required to cover the costs of 
residual liabilities. 
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In the case of Brazil, Nigeria and T & T, where there is no 
legislation that clearly stipulates how residual liability applies, 
the burden for costs should be addressed so that it does not 
fall on the State, through its taxpayers. However, where the 
licensees/contractors have residual liability, the key is to have 
relevant decommissioning provisions which make clear that 
joint and several liability applies even after abandonment. The 
writers suggest a provision along the following lines: 
The responsible parties for decommissioning are 
such parties as have had the rights to explore and 
produce from the licence/contract area. For the 
avoidance of doubt, these are the licensees or 
contractors. Where the contract or licence area has 
been exploited through a joint venture, the 
responsible parties include all joint venture parties. 
In the event that there has been a transfer of interest, 
the assignor will remain a responsible party where 
its assignee is unable to fulfil its obligation for 
decommissioning. Decommissioning liability 
applies for actual decommissioning activities and 
any associated liabilities and costs that arise at the 
end and post decommissioning — decommissioning 
liability applies in perpetuity. 
Industry will be keen to kick against liability in perpetuity. 
Also, there is an argument that 'perpetual liability' is 
unrealistic since many corporations are unlikely to exist 
forever. The State has more permanence than companies. 
Therefore, a middle ground may be to include a provision 
which states that ‘Decommissioning liability applies for actual 
decommissioning activities and includes any associated 
liabilities and costs that arise for up to a certain period (e.g. 40 
years) from the date that decommissioning was completed.’ 
Who then is the responsible party after the said period (i.e. 40 
year)? One solution is for the provision to mandate that any 
decommissioning liabilities that arise after this period will be 
borne by the State in exchange for a lump sum paid by the 
responsible parties. Another solution is for the State to bear 
the liabilities after this period, subject to payment by the 
responsible parties to include agreed interest, for the costs of 
bearing these liabilities (as at when they arise). Ultimately, the 
applicable option depends on each State and the challenges 
before it. As a last attempt to avoid bearing residual liability, 
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States may also consider whether parent companies of 
insolvent responsible parties should bear their 
decommissioning liability. 
Further, on the issue of areas and facilities returned to the 
government, in T & T, the Model PSC 2012 provides that 
'…Minister shall assume all responsibility for the facilities and 
their abandonment and hold Contractor harmless against any 
liability with respect thereto accruing after the date of such 
transfer to Minister (emphasis added). This is clear that the 
Contractor is free from decommissioning obligations in 
relation to such transfer since decommissioning liability 
accrues after the transfer. However, the Brazilian position is 
not so clear since Article 28, Part 1 of the Petroleum Law N. 
9.478/1997 stipulates that the return of areas ‘…will not imply 
any expenses whatsoever for the Federal Government or for 
the ANP…’ (emphasis added) It was earlier argued that a 
robust interpretation of this provision would mean that the 
Contractor has decommissioning and residual liability for 
such returned area. The regulator would likely favour this 
interpretation so as to avoid liability— time will tell how this 
will be decided.  
Another recommendation is the use of financial 
assurances for residual liabilities. In view of the economic 
impacts of COVID-19, insolvency has become an ever-
present reality in the oil and gas industry, at least for the 
foreseeable future. Consequently, states should consider (as 
well as tighten any existing financial assurances the use of 
financial assurances in their decommissioning and residual 
liabilities frameworks. A financial assurance is an instrument 
that guarantees the availability of sufficient funds to cover the 
costs of closure works (such as environmental cleanup) where 
the responsible party (for example, contractor) is unable to 
perform its financial obligations.
125
 This is typically thought 
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of as security.
126
 A financial assurance can assume various 
forms including letter of credit or guarantee from a bank, 
insurer or corporate body and, a decommissioning fund. For 
example, the forms of decommissioning security in the UK 
include, ‘[c]ash, irrevocable standby Letters of Credit (LoCs) 
issued by a Prime Bank, or on demand (performance) bonds 
from Prime Banks or issued by an Insurer regulated under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000…’
127
 It is useful to 
note that the Nigerian Model 2002 and 2005 PSCs include 
decommissioning security, such as form of letters of credit or 
bank guarantees.
128
 T&T’s Model PSC 2012 also includes a 
provision for a decommissioning fund.
129
 Brazilian concession 
and PSCs model forms also provides for similar guarantees 
and such requirements evolved over the past years.
130
 On that 
note, financial assurance may be provided not just for the cost 
of decommissioning, but to cover any future liabilities arising 
from such residues. 
Despite the benefits, these forms of financial assurances 
are also limited in several respects as detailed below. In the 
case of a letter of credit or guarantee from a corporate body, 
there is the inherent risk that the corporate body guarantor 
would go bankrupt or may not be credit worthy at the time of 
decommissioning or residual liabilities.
131
 As Ayoade rightly 
opines ‘future events may erode the creditworthiness of even 
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 The latter argument is applicable to banks and 
insurance companies because they may be unable to afford the 
needed funds for decommissioning and residual liabilities.
133
 
Additionally, corporate bodies, banks and insurance 
companies have limited existence in comparison to the 
perpetuity of residual liabilities. Even in the UK where the 
innovative DSA is used to mitigate the risks of 
decommissioning, the DSA is only able to guarantee that there 
will be funds to cover the estimated costs of decommissioning. 
In reality, the actual costs may be far beyond the estimated 
costs. Therefore, States are encouraged to use financial 
assurances as one (not the sole) mains of mitigating their 
financial exposure for decommissioning and residual 
liabilities. The other considerations put forward by the paper 
further assist in limiting the State’s financial risk in this regard.  
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